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ABSTRACT
JOHN DOYCE GRIFFIN: NATO and Global Expansion
(Under the direction ofDr. Megan Shannon)
This thesis examines NATO and its need for global expansion. It is in the best
interest ofthe alliance to expand globally in order to counter both actual and potential
threats. Global expansion should be considered because NATO has become more
involved in the war against terrorism. The alliance should also consider expansion in
order to counter the attempts of China and Russia to balance against the United States.
Democratic states from all over the globe should be considered for membership in
NATO. This is because they face the threat ofterrorism in the same way as current
members of NATO. Adding democratic members,such as Australia, Brazil, India, Japan,
New Zealand, South Africa, and South Korea, would give the alliance greater manpower
and resources.
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Chapter 1: Introduction
NATO finds itself at an importantjuncture in its history. Some,such as the Cato
Institutes’ Ted Galen Carpenter, argue that NATO no longer serves a purpose(Cooper
1997,440). Accordingly, those ofsimilar opinions would state that the alliance, in its
current state, is insigmficant. Certainly, it has taken measures, such as increased
peacekeeping operations, to remain globally significant. NATO has also trained in
excess of 1,500 Iraqi policemen and has airlifted 5,000 Afiican Union troops into Darfur.
The alliance has continued to train and further assist the African Union troops from their
base in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. None ofthese, or any other, actions have been taken by
NATO in order to simply retain or regain its significance on the global stage. However,
the fact that NATO is currently pursuing a more global agenda does give it a new purpose
or significance.
In today’s world, terrorism is often considered the largest threat to the stability of
the world. NATO has become increasingly involved in the fight against this terror. This
is evident because, as of August 2003, NATO has directed operations in Afghanistan, as
the International Security Assistance Force(ISAF). Also, many individual members of
the alliance have been or are currently participants in Iraq, where a coalition led by the
United States continues to combat terrorist activity. If NATO wishes to remain relevant,
as it has been, it must aggressively fight the war on terror; however, NATO should also
lead the fight against terror because it has the best chance ofovercoming this great threat
to peace and security, thereby retaining stability.
1

NATO must continue to consider the role of democratic states in the war on
terror. If this war is indeed the alliance’s focal point, it needs to determine whether or not
democratic states have more reason than other states to fight terror. If democratic states
are more willing and capable offighting international terrorism, then NATO should
certainly add as many such states as possible. These states should still conform to the
political and economic requirements. Again, if this were the case, states such as
Australia, Japan, and South Korea should be allowed membership because it would create
an even stronger alliance against global terrorism.
Examining NATO’s relationship with Russia will also aid in determining why
issues such as missile defense and the fight for influence in both former Soviet and
Central Asian states have led to great strife. In addition, this will allow NATO to plot a
course for the future. In order to prepare for the future, the alliance must also consider its
relationships with other potentially antagonistic countries, such as China and Iran. In so
doing, NATO will be further aided in determining whether it should expand globally.
It is not necessary for the alliance to grant membership status to any state which
simply possesses a large military or a vibrant economy. While it is interested in states
with these qualities, NATO has commonly held a basic set of guidelines, or desired
requirements, for membership. Member states have often required new members to meet
certain political and economic criteria before being allowed to join the alliance.
Certainly, the criteria should not change.
The addition of additional resources, such as military funding, troops, and bases,
to NATO would be greatly beneficial. It would increase the alliance’s ability to combat
terrorism across the globe. In order to obtain these much needed resources, NATO could
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add new members. These new states should only be those which could bring much
needed assistance to NATO,while meeting the alliance’s requirements for membership.

3

Chapter 2: NATO and the War on Terror
When considering whether or not NATO should expand, it becomes necessary to
note the global war on terror. NATO has declared the war on terror to be a very pressing
issue. Some,such as the current Bush administration, have, at various times, argued that
NATO should not be at the center ofthe war on terror. However, NATO should lead this
fight against international terror because terrorism has become a global problem that
transcends national borders. Therefore, global cooperation is necessary to combat
terrorism. Through expansion, NATO would only increase its ability to fight terror.
Arguably, the war on terror existed long before September 11, 2001. While
international terrorists were actively pursuing mayhem, most countries failed to recognize
the growing threat. In many cases, terrorism was thought to be simply a law enforcement
issue. Looking only as far back as the 1990s proves that terrorism is a global issue.
Global cooperation is needed to combat the growing threat posed by international
terrorism. In addition, world leaders, such as President George W.Bush and Prime
Minister Tony Blair, have finally begun to state that international terrorism is, in fact, a
threat to the world as a whole, especially to democracies.
International terrorism is, indeed, one ofthe greatest threats to world peace and
security. As will be considered, terrorism poses threats beyond boundary lines. It is such
a great threat because it encompasses many ofthe other fears ofthe international
community. As some states are either becoming rouge or failing, they are losing control
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over chemical, biological, and nuclear weaponry. It must be considered that a terror
organization would not hesitate to use such weapons to further its agenda of mayhem and
destruction. Additionally, the ability to plan attacks on one side ofthe globe and carry
them out on the other shows the global nature ofthe threat posed by terrorism.
On February 26,1993, a conglomeration ofIslamic terrorist organizations
attacked, and attempted to destroy, the World Trade Center in New York City. The
attack injured well over 1,000 individuals and killed six. Al-Qaeda, on August 7,1998,
killed 225 people and injured more than four-thousand in coordinated attacks on U.S.
embassies in Kenya and Tanzania. On October 12, 2000, al-Qaeda struck again, as the
U.S.S. Cole was bombed in Yemen. This attack left seventeen U.S. sailors dead and 40
wounded. Al-Qaeda, on September 11,2001, committed one ofthe deadliest terrorist
attacks ever carried out. Terrorists hijacked four different planes, three of which hit their
intended targets. Two planes crashed into the World Trade Center, in New York City.
The Pentagon, in Washington D.C., was also struck by one ofthe hijacked airplanes. The
only plane which failed to reach its target crashed in a Pennsylvama field, after
passengers attempted to resume control ofthe flight. Ultimately, the attack left almost
3,000 people dead.
Richard Reid, on December 22, 2001, attempted to detonate a shoe bomb aboard
American Airlines Flight 63; however, Reid was stopped by passengers before he could
detonate the shoe bomb. On March 11, 2004, al-Qaeda authored a terrorist attack carried
out in Madrid, Spain against commuter trains. The attack saw the death of 191 people
and the injuring of 1,500. In 2005, on July 7, underground trains and one double-decker
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bus were bombed in London. In the wake ofthe attack, 56 were killed and over 700 were
left injured.
Leaders of both the United States and the world,in general, have made statements
noting their informed opinions that terrorism is a great threat to worldwide peace and
security. George W.Bush said,“There can be no peace in a world ofsudden terror. In
the face oftoday’s new threat, the only way to pursue peace is to pursue those who
threaten it”(Bush 2001). Also in reference to military action in Afghanistan, Tony Blair
said,“The world understands that whilst, ofcourse, there are dangers in acting the
dangers ofinaction are far, far greater- the threat offurther such outrages, the threat to
our economies, the threat to the stability ofthe world”(Blair 2001).
The aforementioned international terrorist attacks are not to be interpreted as a list
of all, or even all significant, attacks carried out by global terrorists. These instances
serve as proofthat terrorists are no longer simply looking for a change of government,

or

some other form oflocal concession. Enders and Sandler report that terrorism changed
fi*om being largely secular in nature in 1979. This was the year in which fundamentalist
students took over the U.S. embassy, located in Tehran (Enders and Sandler 2006,47).
In effect, “left-wing and secular terrorists began to be replaced by religious,
fundamentalist terrorists”(Enders and Sandler 2006,47). Table A-1 identifies the stark
differences between secular and fundamentalist terrorism.
These “religious, fundamentalist terrorists”(Enders and Sandler 2006,47)now
seem bent on the destruction ofthe West, in particular the United States(Enders and
Sandler 2006,41). Figure 2.1 shows that between 1968 and 2003,“40% of all
transnational terrorist attacks were against U.S. interests or property”(Enders and
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Sandler 2006,41). This effectively distinguishes modem terrorist movements from
earlier ones. The reason lies in the fact that before 1968, the United States was not the
primary target ofterror; however, since that date, it has become the primary target of
transnational terror attacks(Enders and Sandler 2006,41-42).
Because terrorism presents a global threat, global answers and partners are
needed. However,some have argued they should not be involved in fighting global
terrorism because it is out of their area, or jurisdiction. With ever increasing
globalization and the improvement oftechnology, terrorists can continue to plan attacks
on one side ofthe world and carry them out on the other. Senator Richard Lugar,
Republican leader on the Foreign Relations Committee, argues:
In a world in which terrorist threats can be planned in Germany,financed
in Asia, and carried out in the United States, old distinctions between “in”
and “out of area” have become utterly meaningless. Indeed, given the
global nature ofterrorism, boundaries and other geographical distinctions
are without relevance(Lugar 2002).
Not all agree that NATO should take a leadership role in the war against
international terrorism. In fact, the United States is reluctant to give NATO a major role
in fighting terror. Whatever the case, NATO was not asked to lead the fight in the first
major fronts in the war against terror. These were the 2001 invasion of Afghanistan,
known as Operation Enduring Freedom and the 2003 invasion ofIraq, labeled Operation
Iraqi Freedom. NATO has since become involved, to different extents, in both countries.
Since 2003,the alliance has been in control ofthe operations in Afghanistan, operating as
the ISAF. Although NATO does not actually control military operations in Iraq, it has,
since 2004, been taking an active role in the training ofthe Iraqi military(NATO 2007).
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In the immediate aftermath ofthe September 11, 2001 attacks, NATO invoked
Article V ofthe Washington Treaty, which states:
The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more ofthem in
Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all
and consequently they agree that, ifsuch an armed attack occurs, each of
them, in exercise ofthe right ofindividual or collective self-defence
recognised by Article 51 ofthe Charter ofthe United Nations, will assist
the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in
concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including
the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security ofthe North
Atlantic area.
This is extremely significant because this is the first instance, since the writing ofthe
North Atlantic Treaty in 1949, in which Article V was utilized. The United States
welcomed this invocation but has not allowed NATO members much opportunity to take
action (Sloan 2003,186). Certainly, countries have contributed a limited number of
troops and equipment for operations in both Afghanistan and Iraq. In addition, NATO
has officially taken over peacekeeping operations in Afghanistan, albeit years removed
from the initial attacks. Put simply, the United States has preferred not to fight the war
on terror through NATO’s command structure(Sloan 2003, 186).
To be certain, there are several possible reasons why President Bush chose not to
use NATO as the instrument by which to wage war on global terrorism. Some feel that
Bush and his advisors looked to how operations in Kosovo had taken place. The Bush
administration felt that the United States had been hampered in its strategy- specifically
its targeting strategy. Basically, the French refused to allow strikes on certain targets
which had been identified by U.S. planners(Sloan 2003, 190).
Some in the United States Congress also seemed to have strategic differences with
NATO,or Europe in general. These individuals felt that Europe did not take the war on
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terror as seriously as it should have. In fact, Europe’s lack ofsincerity in the war against
terror could lead to decreased U.S. participation in NATO and, therefore, the ultimate
dissolution ofthe alliance. Senator John McCain stressed,“the need for the European
allies to acquire better capabilities for their armed forces so that they can cope with
sudden terrorist threats and possiblyjoin U.S. troops in a campaign to overthrow Saddam
Hussein in Iraq”(McCain 2002). Senator Richard G. Lugar, a NATO defender and an
advocate for expansion, went even further by claiming that it was unacceptable that the
United States bears the burden ofcombat, while Europe merely contributes troops to
peacekeeping operations. He said:
America is at war and feels more vulnerable than at any time since the end
ofthe Cold War and perhaps since World War II. The threat we face is
global and existential. We need allies and alliances to conJfront it
effectively. Those alliances can no longer be circumscribed by artificial
geographic boundaries. All of America’s alliances are going to be
reviewed and recast in light ofthis new challenge, including NATO. If
NATO is not up to the challenge of becoming effective in the new war
against terrorism, then our political leaders may be inclined to search for
something else that will answer this need (Lugar 2002).
Ultimately, both Congress and President Bush have not relied on NATO because
the alliance is under equipped and ill prepared for fighting terrorism. Certainly,
American apprehensions concerning NATO’s leadership are warranted. However,
despite concerns, many American leaders, such as Lugar, have recognized the need for
international cooperation in the fight against global terror. In order to effectively
promote this international cooperation, a global alliance must be formed. As will be
detailed, NATO is very capable offostering this international cooperation. However,
changes would have to be made to the alliance, including expansion and standardization.
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In order to meet the threats oftoday, NATO members must further align military
weaponry and tactics. A large part ofthe reason why NATO,as a whole, has not already
been prepared to fight the war against international terrorism is a lack ofstandardization.
As more members import high-technology weaponry,they will become more prepared.
Similarly, it may become necessary for more technologically advanced NATO members,
such as the United States and the United Kingdom,to share at least a portion oftheir
technology with other members. This would have the effect ofincreasing the alliance’s
ability to cooperate in both training and combat because more members will be using
more ofthe same tactics and equipment. In addition, NATO states would save money on
research and development and would be able to place much ofthis into the general
NATO defense fund (Sandler and Hartley 1999, 205-208).
The United States had the opportunity to seek more assistance from the other
members of NATO. Much ofthis could have been based on NATO’s 1999 Strategic
Concept, which was presented at the Washington Summit. This document put forth the
continuing political and military ideals ofthe alliance. Certainly, NATO continued its
commitment to collective defense, as prescribed in Article 5 ofthe Washington, or North
Atlantic, Treaty. NATO also made a commitment to improve military capabilities by
ensuring that forces became more mobile, equipped, and better trained in order to carry
out new NATO missions. Most importantly, NATO declared the need to cooperate
globally and to step outside the European theater. This was decided because ofthe grave
potential dangers from things such as biological weapons and transnational terrorism
(Sloan 2003, 107).
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Likewise in the 1999 Strategic Concept, NATO acknowledged that new types of
missions would be forthcoming. Missions could range anywhere from dealing with
regional conflicts, weapons of mass destruction, or even terrorism. In addition, the
alliance noted their support for better relations among member nations and partners.
Most importantly, NATO stated that it was dedicated to strengthening European
participation in operations. In order to promote peace and stability, NATO deemed that it
was dedicated to adding new members through expansion. This became a reality on
March 29,2004 with the accession of Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania,
Slovakia, and Slovenia.
It must be noted that through the debate over the 1999 Strategic Concept, it
became quite obvious that great differences existed between the United States, along with
the United Kingdom, and other European allies. The U.S. and the U.K. hoped to use this
document to declare that NATO could embark on non-Article 5 missions without consent
from the U.N. Security Council. European allies, such as Germany and France, were
greatly disturbed by this notion. They did agree that the alliance needed occasionally to
take action without Security Council consent; however,these instances should be only an
exception to the rule. In other words, they were not in favor of declaring that NATO
would often step outside the parameters of U.N. consent. The two sides compromised
and decided that NATO would, after careful consideration in each case, make itself
available to take action without the Security Council’s consent. In May 1999, this would
first be applied with NATO action in Kosovo (Sloan 2003, 107-110).
Ultimately, the United States could not only have received more assistance from
other NATO members, but it had the chance to push the alliance far beyond the 1999
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Strategic Concept. After September 11, 2001,there was great unity in the alliance.
Article 5 was invoked for the first time in the history ofthe alliance. All members were
willing to aid the United States in some fashion. By operating through NATO,the
United States could have set a great precedent for both operating outside the geographic
limits of Europe and cooperating globally to combat transnational terrorism.
NATO should go as far as adding states which do not currently all reside within
the geographical confines ofEurope. In doing so, the alliance will be better prepared to
combat transnational terrorism and other such threats. As has been noted,“the point of
the alliance is no longer territorial defense but bringing together countries with similar
values and common interests to combat global problems”(Daalder and Goldgeier 2006,
109). Other democratic countries share many ofthe same values and interests as does
NATO. Inclusive ofsuch states are Australia, Brazil, India, Japan, New Zealand, South
Africa, and South Korea. Such states have the ability to improve the efforts of NATO by
providing more troops and support. Australia, Japan, and South Korea have already
proven themselves to be of great value by providing significant numbers oftroops to
support NATO members striving to stabilize Iraq. Similarly, Brazil, India, and South
Africa have proven they are capable ofimproving the alliance because oftheir sigmficant
contributions offorces to various peacekeeping missions(Daalder and Goldgeier 2006,
109-110).
The alliance has not gone far enough in its globalization process. It has begun to
recognize the need for global cooperation through dialogue and some shared operations.
However,forming global partnerships is not enough. “Formal membership would
strengthen the ability ofcountries to work together in joint military operations”(Daalder
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and Goldgeir 2006, 110). NATO members benefit fi*om planning, training, and fighting
alongside their fellow members. This would certainly have the effect of allowing NATO
to respond more capably in a future crisis situation. Ultimately, many European
militaries have become overstretched. This is not to say that the American military does
not suffer from the same problem; however, it is more prepared to deal with this
particular situation. Whatever the case, adding new, and better prepared, members to the
alliance would enable NATO to effectively combat the threat oftransnational terrorism
(Daalder and Goldgeir 2006, 110-111).
To be certain, the alliance has been the premier regional military alliance in the
world. Since terrorism is an international threat, NATO must take additional steps in
order to form a global alliance. This must be done even to the extent of adding new
members fi*om across the globe. It is in the best interest ofthe alliance to do so. The
alliance will maintain its significance, and it will lead the world in a fight against a most
dangerous enemy.
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Chapter 3: NATO,Russia, and the East
While NATO’s most important role in global affairs is currently the war on terror,
it would be unwise not to consider the alliance’s current relationship with Russia. To be
certain, many members of NATO still wish to guard themselves against Russia, despite
apparent improvements in the relationship. Many former Warsaw Pact nations, which are
now members of NATO,fear a resurgent Russia, which could threaten them at some
point in the future (Sloan 2003, 8). In addition, NATO members,such as the United
States, are very uncomfortable with the lack ofprogress that Russia has made in opening
up its political structme and economy. As will be discussed, Russia continues to be
displeased with the alliance in general. It is especially unhappy with NATO’s continued
expansion into Eastern Europe, missile defense, and U.S. influence in Central Asia.
Ultimately, NATO should expand globally in order to counter Russian attempts to
balance with China against the United States.
Recently, Russia appears to have become much friendlier with nations such as
China and Iran. As will be seen, these nations have, through the Shanghai Cooperation
Organization(SCO), begun to cooperate in Central Asia. This has, in many cases, led to
the thwarting of U.S. interests in the region. Certainly, many members of NATO are not
fond of this revelation-especially the United States. Examining NATO’s ongoing
relationship with Russia and its potential allies could lend credence to the expansion of
NATO. If NATO is in fact fearful ofthe potential existence ofthe next “Warsaw Pact,”
expanding the alliance globally would inherently make it more secure.
14

During the Bush administration, the close personal ties between President Bush
and President Vladimir Putin of Russia have been highly publicized. The two built a
personal relationship built on mutual respect. In fact, Putin interjected that with he and
Bush at the helm of their respective countries, a warm partnership could exist between
Russia and the United States(Wyatt 2001). President Bush has even hosted his Russian
counterpart at the ranch in Crawford, TX. To be certain, the two leaders have a strong
personal relationship. However,their personal friendship has not made the fact of a
strained professional relationship any less realistic.
Despite leaving their first ever meeting in Ljubljana at the 2001 Slovenia Summit
with positive feelings, both parties realized that much was left lacking. The summit
meeting was held in Slovenia so the two leaders could meet with one another on fairly
neutral territory. In addition, both leaders met with Prime Minister Janez Dmovsek and
President Milan Kucan, both of Slovenia. By hosting the meeting, the Slovenes were
hoping to increase the awareness of their country. Also, they hoped that President Bush
might extend an invitation to join NATO. Although they were not given an invitation at
that meeting, Slovenia did eventually become a NATO member in 2004. Putin,
Dmovsek, and Kucan discussed the various Southern European affairs(Pozim 2001). As
far as U.S.-Russian talks are concerned, no actual problems were solved. With the
exception of stronger personal ties between the leaders of Russia and the United States,
little had changed by the end ofthe summit. Both countries still had the same suspicions
and problems they previously held. Russia was still against the expansion of NATO and
missile defense, while the United States stood firm in its support for both. Vladimir Putin
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clung to the idea that the United States should not pursue any unilateral action in the case
of missile defense(Wyatt 2001).
In order to understand the heightened tensions between the two countries, which
brought other countries into the fray, necessitates reviewing the events which haven place
since the June 2001 summit meeting. The events of September 11,2001 set the United
States and President Bush farther down a course which was already displeasing to Russia.
These events led to competitions between the two nations, and others, for influence in
various Asian countries. In fact, Russia began working closely with China and others in
order to combat pro-American sentiments in the region. As will be seen, Russia and
China cooperated within the framework of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization in
order to lessen U.S. influence in the Central Asian region. This has aroused the need to
check the envisioned threat from an alliance consisting ofRussia, China, Iran, and others.
On the simplest oflevels, the United States and Russia have continually differed
on missile defense, issues surrounding the war in Iraq, continued NATO expansion, and
the Central Asian region in general. Ofcourse, the problems between the two go to a
much deeper level. In some aspects, it seems as though both countries have reverted to
Cold War mentalities. Both states have accused one another ofspying and have expelled
the supposed perpetrators. In the aftermath ofthe September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks on
the United States, a battle for influence in Central Asia has been brewing.
In March 2001, both Russia and the United States began to expel diplomats
deemed to be operating as spies. White House officials confirmed that their expulsion of
up to 50 Russian diplomats was at least partially related to the arrest ofFBI agent Robert
Hanssen. Hanssen was arrested on suspicions of passing highly classified documents and
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information to Moscow for several years. In response, the Bush administration chose to
expel up to 50 ofthe 450 Russian diplomats suspected ofoperating as spies. The BBC
reported that among these 50 were the direct Russian handlers ofRobert Hanssen {BBC
2001). Certainly, Russia soon retaliated by expelling around 50 American diplomats who
were also accused of spying. Sergei Prikhodko, a senior Russian foreign affairs aide,
admitted to the Russian Itar-Tass news that “Any campaign ofspy mania and searching
for enemies brings deep regret... this is a fallback to the Cold War era”(2001).
Even before the spying expulsions, relations between the United States and Russia
were strained at best. The United States continued to accuse Russia of giving new
technology to hostile states. On the other hand, Russia continually expressed its
displeasure with the United States over its plan to deploy missile defense systems in
former Soviet territory. Also, the Russians were not keen on proposed American talks
with Chechen separatists {BBC 2001). However,these talks did eventually occur in
March 2001, as the Chechen foreign minister met with U.S. State Department officials
(Wines 2001).
Concerning missile defense systems, it is certain there are great tensions between
Russia and the United States. Ifthere were any doubt. President Putin made his position
clear in Munich at a conference on international security. At this conference Putin
accused the United States ofreviving the Cold War mentality by stockpiling nuclear
weapons and showing an “almost uncontained hyper use offorce in international
relations”(2007). However,Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates heavily denied the fact
that the United States had returned to any form of Cold War thinking.
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In December 2001,the United States announced that it intended to withdraw from
the Anti-Ballistic Missile(ABM)Treaty. The ABM Treaty had been signed in 1972 and
sought to limit the signatories’ use of missile defense systems. Certainly, this was due to
the fact that President Bush hoped to develop antimissile shield technology which could
be deployed to protect both the United States and her allies. This action has also brought
concern to groups such as the Council on Foreign Relations(CFR). The CFR has noted
that the United States withdrawing from the ABM Treaty brings into question what will
be done when the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty I(START-I)and the Moscow Treaty
expire in 2009 and 2012 respectively(Beehner 2007). The START-I Treaty bound both
the Soviet Union and the United States to limit their number ofdeployed strategic
offensive arms,such as nuclear warheads. The Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty
(SORT), as the Moscow Treaty is formally known, was signed in 2002 by the Russian
Federation and the United States. The Moscow Treaty effectively limited the signatories
to deploying between 1,700 and 2,200 nuclear warheads each. There is great concern
over how the expiration ofthese particular treaties will further affect the relationship
between the United States and Russia. This is seemingly because there is a fear that ifthe
reduction treaties expire and U.S.-Russian relations continue to deteriorate then another
arms race might proceed.
The bulk ofthe contention between the United States and Russia on the issue of
missile defense lies in the wishes ofthe United States to place missile defense shields on
former Soviet dominated territory. The United States has developed plans to deploy
antimissile shields in both Poland and the Czech Republic. It is important to note that
while both of these particular states are indeed former Soviet satellites, they are also
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current members of NATO. Russia is also adamantly opposed to the United States’ plan
to place bases in Romania and Bulgaria. Putin did not leave the world wondering if
Russia was actually in opposition when he commented that those actions “could provoke
nothing less than the beginning ofa nuclear era”(Putin 2007). According to the CFR and
James Hackett ofthe Washington Times, Putin’s reaction is reminiscent ofthe Soviet
Union’s reaction to the Pershing II missiles being placed throughout Europe in the 1980s
(Beehner 2007). Defense Secretary Gates responded that deployment of antimissile
shields in Poland and the Czech Republic should not be considered as a threat to Russia.
According to Gates, the antimissile shields would be deployed in order to protect the
United States and her allies from an attack by a hostile nation or group, such as Iran or alQaeda(Beehner 2007).
Russian officials argue that neither the United States nor NATO actually needs to
deploy antimissile shields. Russia feels that members ofNATO should feel secure
enough in their Article V collective security protections without the aid of missile
defense systems. According to the CFR,experts feel that Russia might feel compelled to
place dummy warheads among the warheads currently in their arsenal. This would
confuse the missile defense systems ofthe United States(Beehner 2007). In fact,
Russian Defense Minister Sergei B.Ivanov said,“We have the capability to surpass any
antimissile system;” however, he added,“It doesn’t mean that we threaten others”(2007).
In order to further prove that the debate over missile defense systems has led to
strained relations between Russia and the United States, it is only proper to notice what
steps the Russian military has taken. Largely due to the United States’ desire to deploy
missile defense systems in former Soviet dominated territory, Russia has begun to
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develop the Topol-M ballistic missile. In 2006, Russian spending on defense increased
by 23 percent and totaled $32.4 billion. It is important to note that this figure is the most
that Russia has spent on defense since the end ofthe Cold War(Beehner 2007).
In 2006, the Kremlin also started a new rearmament program with the purpose of
developing the Russian military’s high-tech equipment. George H. Wittman,in the
American Spectator, wrote that “Russia is once again returning to international arms
competition with a heavy accent on advanced weaponry”(2007). In addition, the
Russians may have been fueled to invest in high-tech weaponry because of an article that
appeared in Foreign Affairs and was written by Keir A. Lieber and Daryl G.Press. In the
article, the authors made the assertion that “the era ofinternational great power wars has
ended”(2006). They attributed the end ofthese wars to the fact that the nuclear systems
ofthe United States had greatly improved while those in Russia had declined in quality.
This led to a return to Cold War thinking in Russia and caused many to desire a more
prominent role for the military and high-tech weaponry in Russia.
Generally speaking, Russian officials have not been in favor ofNATO expansion.
With each expansion of NATO,Russia has become more at odds with the West, the
United States in particular. That is to say that Russia has become increasingly
disillusioned with the continual eastern expansion ofNATO. The fact that most ofthese
expansions are taking place in former Soviet dominated territory has only added to the
tensions between Russia and the West. On February 24,1998,the chairman ofthe
Russian Duma’s Committee on International Affairs, Vladimir Lukin, held a press
briefing with 16 different reporters. In this briefing, he mentioned that Russians were
offended by NATO expansion and the continued talks concerning future expansion. He
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said that Russian officials considered NATO expansion to be dangerous and isolating to
Russia. In addition, Lukin said continued NATO expansion would “strengthen the
nationalist forces in Russia”(1998). Lukin continued by explaining that Russia was
opposed to any unilateral action by the United States in Iraq. He also added that officials
of the United States should not assume that simply because they thought NATO
expansion was good for Russia that Russians had the same opinion {Global Beat 1998).
More recently, tensions between the United States and Russia have risen due to
the war on terror. At least in the eyes ofthe United States, the world became very
different in the aftermath of September 11, 2001. Regardless, the war on international
terrorism, and its surrounding issues, has indeed caused further rifts between Washington
and Moscow. As will be discussed, any cooperation that existed in the days and weeks
after the attacks of September 11,2001 has been lost. Military action in Iraq, Russian
involvement in the U.N. Oil for Food Scandal, and the fight for influence in Central Asia
have all ratcheted up tensions between Washington and Moscow.
In the immediate aftermath ofthe September 11,2001 attacks on the United
States, Russia, like many other nations, announced their support for the grief stricken
American nation. To be certain, Russia proved to be a great diplomatic tool in aiding the
United States to secure airbases in Central Asia for an impending attack on the Taliban.
However, beyond this fact, it seems that most support jfrom Russia has come on the
purely rhetorical level(Marcus 2004).
In 2003,the United States led a coalition to remove Saddam Hussein fi*om power
in Iraq. In the events preceding the invasion, Russia, along with China, France, and
Germany, proved to be firmly opposed to potential U.S. actions. The U.N. Security
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Council had passed Resolution 1441, which gave Saddam’s regime an ultimatum. Iraq
was required to declare its inventory of prohibited weaponry in order that weapons
inspectors might verify the destruction ofsuch weapons. Most importantly, Saddam was
given a deadline of December 7, 2002; if he failed to meet this deadline he would face
severe consequences. The United States chose to interpret this as a reason for invasion,
in the event that Saddam did not comply with Resolution 1441 by the said date. When
December 7, 2002 had long since passed, Saddam was still not in compliance. The
French and Germans, purportedly speaking for all ofEurope, demanded that Iraq be
given more time and that more weapons inspectors should be sent. The United States
was shocked when Russia, which had been cooperative imtil this point, signed the
document which set forth the aforementioned position. In effect, France, Russia, and
Germany wished to set up a number of deadlines for Iraq to meet. All ofthis was done in
response to a British, American, and Spanish resolution which would have simply
declared that Saddam was still in violation of Resolution 1441. By this time, this was
accepted by both the American and French contingents. It must be noted that Prime
Minister Tony Blair, ofthe United Kingdom, had already garnered signatures of support
for the United States from Spain, Italy, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Hungary, and
Poland. In addition, the ten nations who were then being considered for membership in
the European Union also announced their support for both the U.S. and the U.K. The
Chinese proved to be just as willing as France, Germany, and Russia to block any
proposed U.S. military action against Iraq. They, along with France and Russia, made it
known that they would block any resolution which would bring about military action
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against Iraq (Sicherman 2003). In the end, and despite bitter opposition from allies, the
coalition was able to gain control ofIraq in less than three weeks(Goldstein 47).
Problems especially begin to rise in the aftermath ofthe coalition invasion ofIraq
in the form of the United Nations Oil for Food Scandal. To be certain, the program had a
noble purpose in mind. It sought to “provide for the humanitarian needs ofthe Iraqi
people until the fulfilment by Iraq ofthe relevant Security Council resolutions”(U.N.
Security Council Resolution 986 April 14,1995,1). U.N. Security Council Resolution
986 continued to note “the need for equitable distribution of humanitarian reliefto all
segments of the Iraqi population throughout the country”(1995,1).
The trouble lay not in the United Nations Oil for Food Program, but in the
scandalous actions ofsome participants. This inevitably led to great strife between
traditional allies and foes alike. Numerous investigations uncovered the close ties
between French, Russian, and Iraqi officials in the years before 2003. In this case, the
close links ofthe Russians and Saddam’s officials are most important to note. Russia,
along with France, appeared to have the most to gain by Saddam Hussein retaining his
firm grip over the people ofIraq. According to the Heritage Foundation,France and
Russia controlled approximately 40 percent ofIraqi oil wealth before Hussein’s fall from
power(Gardiner and Phillips 2004). It must be noted that Russian and French
involvement in this buying ofoil and oil fields was illegal because of U.N. sanctions
which had been imposed on Iraq. Through this scandal, Saddam Hussein reportedly
made over $10 billion. He did this by “smuggling and systematic thievery, by demanding
illegal payments from companies buying Iraqi oil, and through kickbacks from those
selling goods to Iraq”(Gardiner and Phillips 2004). The United States was particularly
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angered by the U.N. Oil-for-Food Scandal. In particular, tensions with both France and
Russia increased. This was due, in large part, to the fact that Russian and French actions
had ultimately blocked U.S. efforts to punish Iraq for its failure to comply with U.S. and
Security Council demands. The scandal also led to the United States, President Bush in
particular, to voice its opinion that the United Nations was becoming irrelevant and
needed to reform. In the aftermath ofthe scandal, it should not be surprising to find that
Hussein and the Russians cooperated closely- even when that cooperation was in
violation of the U.N. Oil for Food Program (Gardiner and Phillips 2004).
It is now possible to understand at least a portion ofthe political and military ties
which Russia had with Saddam’s regime before the 2003 invasion ofIraq. This, in large
part, is due to documents found in the former headquarters ofSaddam Hussein’s
intelligence service, the Mukhabarat(Gardiner and Phillips 2004). The London Sunday
Telegraph summed up these reports by saying:
Russia provided Saddam Hussein's regime with wide-ranging assistance in
the months leading up to the war, including intelligence on private
conversations between Tony Blair and other Western leaders. Moscow
also provided Saddam with lists of assassins available for "hits" in the
West and details of arms deals to neighbouring countries(Harrison 2003).
Russia appears to have been no quieter militarily than it was politically. Based on an
article in the Washington Post, written by Peter Slevin, the Heritage Foundation notes the
extensive selling of Russian arms to Iraq. Indeed, this action was in direct violation of
the U.N. Oil for Food Program; however,the Russians sold weapons to Saddam’s regime
until immediately before the U.S. led invasion of Iraq. According to Slevin and the
Heritage Foundation, President Bush’s administration cited that the Russians continually
sold Iraq “anti-tank guided missiles, electronic jamming equipment, and thousands of
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night vision goggles”(Gardiner and Phillips 2004). David Harrison, ofthe London
Sunday Telegraph, reported that, over the course of his dictatorship, Russia provided
Saddam with almost $14 billion in shipments of weaponry(Harrison 2003).
Rajan Menon,in “The New Great Game in Central Asia,” argues that despite the
appearance ofimproved relations between the United States and Russia, nothing of
substance has changed. Menon states that relations between the U.S. and Russia have
really only improved on the surface. He notes that the strong personal relationship
between Bush and Putin, a potential agreement on slashing strategic nuclear weaponry,
and a greater consultative role for Russia in NATO have often been used by the Western
media as evidence for a great improvement in U.S.-Russian relations(Menon 2003, 193194). However, Menon believes that “the Russian position has not changed as
dramatically as some American observers assert”(Menon 2003, 193). He states that
Russia “still suspects that Washington is seeking to undermine [their] interests and
eroding its few remaining positions ofpower”(Menon 2003, 193). According to Menon,
Russia believes this because ofcontinued NATO expansion;
the launching ofa missile defence programme and the withdrawal from
the ABM Treaty; the war against Iraq; and single minded U.S. support for
the Baku-Ceyhan pipeline, which will carry oil fi’om Azerbaijan(and
perhaps eventually to Kazakhstan)to Turkey, circumventing Russia and
increasing the regional influence of Turkey, America’s ally(Menon 2003,
193).
Menon further noted that Russia chose to cooperate with the United States because it
could do nothing about the fact that the U.S. had, at the very least, interrupted its historic
dominance in Central Asia. He ascertained that if the United States failed to control the
region, the Russians would have a difficult time doing so independently(Menon 2003,
194).
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Throughout the U.S.-led war on terror, a struggle has been taking place in Central
Asia- a fight for influence. In this particular case, Russia is not singularly opposing the
interests of the United States; it has brought others, specifically China,to her side. The
attacks of September 11, 2001 on the United States and its aftermath greatly impacted
Central Asia. Initially, Central Asian countries were very receptive to the United States.
However, as situations became more unstable many began to long for the stability that
Russia had once provided (Rywkin 2006, 193-194).
As the U.S. military began to prepare for its operations against the Taliban in
Afghanistan, many Central Asian countries agreed to allow the U.S. to use their airspaces
and airbases. Russia and China were alarmed at the apparent commonality being
displayed between the United States and many ofthese Central Asian states. In 2005,
events taking place in Kyrg3^stan, Uzbekistan, and Kazakhstan effectively shifted the
balance ofinfluence back into the hands ofRussia and China. The United States did,
however, attempt to retain, or in some cases regain, their new found influence in the
region. Basically, internal events in Central Asia led to some nations internationally
aligning themselves differently(Rywkin 2006, 193-194).
In March 2005, the Tulip Revolution occurred in Kyrgyzstan. This “color
revolution” followed others similar to it in Georgia and the Ukraine. Mostly non-violent
protests in Georgia and the Ukraine had led to a change in government; many in
Kyrgyzstan thought it was time for the same to occur in their own country. President
Askar Akayev’s administration was consistently under fire for being corrupt. In addition,
many were fearful that President Akayev would seek to lengthen his term in office by
imposing a referendum upon the people. In the precursor to Kyrgyzstan’s February 2005
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elections, independent media sources only increased the fervor oftheir corruption charges
against Akayev. This helped lead to large demonstrations in the streets against President
Akayev, and, by March 24, he was forced to flee from Kyrgyzstan. The peaceful
revolution in Kyrgyzstan left its neighbors wary ofpossible U.S. involvement. Similarly,
many were fearful that another “color revolution” would soon occur elsewhere in the
region (Rywkin 2006,194; 197).
Not only did the Tulip Revolution aid in destabilizing Central Asia, it also
provided the Russians, as well as the neighbors of Kyrgyzstan,reason to believe that the
United States had engineered the revolution. Russians point to evidence published in an
article in the New York Times entitled “U.S. Helped to Prepare the Way for Kyrgyzstan’s
Uprising.” The article discusses the United States’ role in providing large amounts of
funding for pro-democracy groups and programs in the state ofKyrgyzstan. Many of
these groups were pro-democracy nongovernmental organizations. These groups set up
centers throughout Kyrgyzstan where pro-democratic citizens could meet, plan
demonstrations, read newspapers, watch CNN,use the internet, and be trained. The
author specifically details an opposition newspaper which received funding from the
United States and was aided by an American organization. Freedom House. Shortly
before the February 2005 elections, this newspaper ran pictures ofa magnificent home
that was being built for President Akayev. This seemed to put many citizens over the top
and massive protests began to take place(Smith 2005).
Problems once again flared in Central Asia, this time in Uzbekistan. To be
certain, Russia and the United States were both involved in a fight for influence. On May
13, 2005, a crowd ofIslamists, most of which were women and children, were fired upon
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by the Uzbek military. At the time, the president ofUzbekistan was Islam Karimov. He
was widely known for his background involving Communism, which led many to link
this to his oppressive behavior. He not only suppressed democratic movements but
Islamic ones as well. To Karimov,the Islamists were basically a terrorist organization.
Since the United States were fighting Islamic terrorists in Afghanistan at the time, he felt
he and the United States had something in common. He convinced himselfthat the
United States and the rest ofthe West would understand and commend his actions.
However, Karimov’s actions in Andijon were condemned by the West. The strategic
partnership which Karimov had signed with the United States now appeared to be over.
Because of his rejection by the West, Karimov sought support fi*om Russia and China. In
order to turn Uzbekistan and Karimov away firom the United States, the Russians
convinced him that they had intelligence that the Islamists that had been fired upon in
Andijon were actually terrorists fi:om Afghanistan. This, of course, was an attempt to
make Karimov believe that the United States was being hypocritical in not supporting his
own fight against terror. Most importantly, many were still convinced that the United
States actually encouraged the Andijon demonstrations. In the end, both the Russians
and the Chinese were able to take advantage ofthe United States’ involvement in Iraq
and Afghanistan. The United States was too busy fighting in those coimtries to devote
enough time and energy to save their influence in Uzbekistan. Karimov allowed the
Russians to post troops inside Uzbekistan for the first time since Uzbekistan gained its
independence. Additionally, Karimov closed the American military base at Khanabad.
The whole situation caused such a great uproar of anti-Americanism that the United
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States was barely able to retain its military base at Manas,Kyrgyzstan(Rywkin 2006,
194; 197-198).
Overall, Kazakhstan seemed very troubled by perceived American involvement in
all the “color revolutions” that had been sweeping through the former Soviet dominated
states. The West’s reaction to Kazakhstan’s presidential election in December 2005
could have pushed Kazakhstan further in the direction ofRussia and China. Both the
Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe and the European Union criticized
the election as not meeting the minimum international standards. The fact that
Kazakhstan had little experience in the realm offree elections was not completely
considered. Although Russia and China appeared to gain much in Kazakhstan,the
United States was able to retain some influence. The United States was allowed to
maintain its presence in the Caspian Sea area. In addition. President Nazarbayev agreed
to offer the new, pro-American leaders of Kyrgyzstan financial aid(Rywkin 2006,195196).
Before noting Russia’s increased cooperation with China,Iran, and other nations
in the greater Central Asian region, it is necessary to briefly discuss the alignment ofthe
region, realism, and balancing theory. To an extent, many nations in the greater Central
Asian region have been in a process ofaligning themselves. Arguably, Japan,India, and
Taiwan have aligned themselves with the United States, whereas China and Iran have
begun to loosely align themselves with Russia.
Japan has long been an ally ofthe United States and it should be no surprise that it
is currently “a platform for the projection of American power”(Menon 2003,197).
Similarly, Taiwan is defended and armed by the United States and is most often aligned
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with the United States. Even before the September 11,2001 attacks, India had begun to
see the benefits of aligning itself with the United States. President Clinton visited India
in 2000 and effectively improved relations between the two nations. When President
Bush took office in 2001,relations with India continued to improve. In essence, the Bush
administration felt that, since the collapse ofthe Soviet Union, China was the next
potential great threat to the United States and its interests. In this context administration
officials felt that India would be a better partner than Pakistan, which had been
traditionally aligned with China. However, after the attacks of September 11,2001,the
Bush administration realized the geographic advantage it could gain by using Pakistani
bases. This was despite the fact that India took the political risk ofoffering the United
States usage of its air and land bases. India was at first upset that the U.S. basically chose
Pakistan over them. However,India has since come to believe that U.S. intervention in
Pakistan actually helps to stabilize the region. Additionally, the United States has been
very supportive ofIndia in any conflict it has had with Pakistan. When Pakistan-linked
terrorists bombed the Indian Parliament in 2001,the U.S. demanded that Pakistan round
up those who were responsible. The United States announced that it was in complete
agreement with India’s decision to mass its forces against its border with Pakistan.
Furthermore, the U.S. froze the assets ofthe two Pakistani groups thought to be
responsible for the bombing. This is all to say that despite the fact that the United States
has become heavily involved in Pakistan, its relationship with India is still quite strong.
In fact, through it all, the United States and India have actually gained a deeper
understanding and better relations(Menon 2003,194-197).
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In order to increase its influence in the Central Asian region, China sought to
form strategic relationships with Russia,Iran, and Pakistan. In the eyes ofthe Chinese,
Pakistan, at least its government, was lost to the United States in the aftermath of
September 11,2001. China now faced the United States having troops to its east in Japan
and to its west in Central Asia. Accordingly,two potential allies came to mind: Russia
and Iran. As will be detailed, Russia and China,in 2001,formed a partnership in the
Shanghai Cooperation Organization. Iran came to mind because ofsituations taking
place in Iran. While it can be said that many,ifnot the majority, ofIranian youth seek
better relations with the West,the Iranian government is not. In fact, the conservative
government of Iran is fearful ofa close relationship with the West because it could lead
to demonstrations or even revolution(Menon 2003,197-198).
In order to understand why China, Russia, and the United States are taking the
previously outlined actions, it is necessary to note certain theories found in international
relations. In international relations, realism can be defined as “a struggle for power
among self-interested states”(Walt 1998,31). In addition, realism is not very positive
about the chances of ever ending conflict. Classical realism holds that states, like people,
often seek to completely dominate others. However, neo-realism focuses more on the
nature of the international system. To the neo-realist, the international system is made of
both powerful and weak states. Accordingly,the weaker states seek to balance the power
of the more powerful states in order to protect themselves. This is necessary because the
international system is anarchic. In other words,there is no government to prevent the
greater powers from dominating the weaker ones. In this situation, balancing is a
completely logical tool to be employed by weaker powers(Walt 1998,31).
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According to neo-realist theory, China and Russia should seek to balance against
the United States, which has interrupted their dominance in Central Asia. As noted, both
nations’ interests in the region have been damaged by the presence ofthe United States.
Both countries could also seek to balance with other states which face similar threats
from U.S. presence. Accordingly, Russia and China could seek to balance against the
United States alongside Iran. Iran has an interest in staving offthe United States because
it wants to keep its nuclear program running, as well as wanting to keep its younger
population from more Western influence. To a degree,these three states have already
begun the process of attempting to balance against the United States. That is to say that
all three have taken measures to cooperate against the United States’ interests. The
cooperation of Russia and China is apparent in the previously mentioned situations in
Central Asia. Both Russia and China have become cooperative with Iran in various
ways. However,this is best seen by looking at the Shanghai Cooperation Organization.
There is reason to believe that ifRussia is left out ofthe Western community of
nations, it will feel isolated and will seek a partner to balance against the West. If Russia
is spumed by the West,or even ifit feels it has been, there is a great chance of an alliance
between Russia and China. The fact that the two nations have had troubles in the past
will not prevent any military alliance. This is because states will eventually find allies
whenever and wherever they are forced to do so. Considering that Russia has never
enjoyed feeling threatened from both east and west, it would be unwise not to at least
consider a potential military alliance between Russia and China(Russett and Stam 1998).
The potential alliance between Russia and China would greatly benefit both sides.
From the Russian perspective, it would benefit greatly from allying with an increasingly
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wealthy nation of 1.2 billion people. This would certainly pay great dividends in trying
to balance against NATO. China would also benefit in a military alliance. It already has
a large number of people and wealth; however, it lacks advanced military technology.
Russia, with its 150 million people, natural resources, and military technology, would
bring many benefits to the Chinese. The most important ofthese is military technology.
China would be able to improve its military capabilities at a cheaper cost. In turn,
Russian military and industry would most likely stop contracting due to increased sales
and research (Russett and Stam 1998).
The foundations for a military alliance primarily between Russia and China have
already been laid. In fact, these foundations began to be laid in the 1990s. In 1996,
China reportedly bought, firom Russia, seventy-two SU-27 advanced fighter planes.
More importantly, it was also agreed that China would build a plant in Shenyang to make
more SU-27 advanced fighter planes. This is extremely significant because SU-27
fighter planes have transcontinental capability. In other words, using these planes, China
would actually be able to strike Moscow. Around the same time, Russia also sold China
two cruise missile warships, hi the latter part of 1996, China and Russia agreed to cut the
number of troops on their borders, announced trade agreements, and agreed to more arms
deals in the future. In 1997, Russian Defense Minister,Igor Rodionov declared that his
country had no real link with NATO. While doing so, he stated that relations between
Russia and China were improving drastically, especially in the military sphere (Russett
and Stam 1998).
The Shanghai Cooperation Organization(SCO)is made up of Russia, China,
Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan. Before the inclusion of Uzbekistan,
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the SCO was known as the Shanghai Five. As it stands today,the organization serves as
a political, economic, and security alliance; however,the security aspect ofthe alliance is
emphasized. It is apparent that the leader ofthe alliance is China. At a June 2005
summit meeting in Astana, the Chinese emphasized the need to set dates for the closing
of U.S. military bases in Central Asia. In other words,the SCO clearly took an antiAmerican stance. Through this organization, Russia and China have become extremely
cooperative(Rywkin 2006,202-203). They have attempted to cooperate on fighting
secessionist forces such as those in Chechnya and in the Chinese province ofXinjiang.
While efforts to cooperate have not paid great dividends in the area ofregional security,
they have served as a counter to increased U.S. mfluence(Blank 2002). The Russians are
expected to focus on security responsibilities, while the Chinese seek to improve the
economies ofthe Central Asian region. Because many Central Asian leaders are fearful
ofthe presence ofthe U.S. military, many are happy to have the presence of an active
Russia and China in the region. However, most wish the United States to maintain at
least some semblance of a presence in Central Asia. If nothing else, this would maintain
a balance between the sides, with a slight advantage to the Russians and Chinese. It must
be noted that along with its policy toward the United States, Iran has became an observer
in the SCO. Even before this, Russia began aiding Iran in its quest to supposedly develop
nuclear power. This was despite the fact that the West was against this because ofthe
suspicion that Iran was using nuclear power as a guise to develop nuclear weapons.
Cooperation between Russia, China, and Iran has increased and show few signs of
slowing. Indeed, this newfound cooperation could only cause trouble for the United
States in the region(Rywkin 2006,209-210).
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It would be erroneous to say that the cooperation ofRussia, China, and Iran does
not, at most, pose a possible threat to the United States and the West in general. At the
very least, the close cooperation between Russia, China, and Iran will most likely
continue to frustrate the interests ofthe United States and her allies. The March 2008
debate on the United Nations Security Council demonstrates this. The United States,
Great Britain, and France wanted tough sanctions to be imposed on Iran as pimishment
for their continued desire to obtain nuclear capability. However,Russia and China
sought language that would do little more than condenm Iran’s actions. Since they are
linked closely economically with Iran, Russia and China would stand to lose significantly
if extremely harsh sanctions were ever placed upon Iran. The U.N. Security Council did
eventually impose sanctions on Iran; however,the sanctions were not as strong as the
West desired (Karon 2008).
After having examined the closer ties between Russia, China, and Iran, it becomes
necessary to briefly examine the threat ofrogue states. The United States and its allies
have often been concerned with the threats posed by rogue states. Rogue states “are
characterized as acquiring WMD and the means (i.e., ballistic missiles) to deliver them”
(Sandler and Hartley 1999,182). In addition, these rouge states are often said to be
sponsors or condoners ofterrorism. It is for this reason that many in the West fear that a
rogue state will, either purposely or inadvertently, allow a terrorist organization to obtain
a portion of its nuclear, chemical, and/or biological weaponry. As far back as 1999,it
was identified that NATO was concerned about rogue states threatening “resource supply
lines, strategic regions, and emerging democracies”(Sandler and Hartley 1999,183).
Sandler and Hartley identified that Iran is considered a rogue state, while China is a
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potential rogue state (1999,183). Along with having the largest mihtary in the world,
China currently possesses nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles. It also potentially has
both chemical and biological weapons. Iran is currently developing nuclear weapons and
most likely has biological weapons. It certainly already has both chemical weapons and
ballistic missiles(Sandler and Hartley 1999,184-186). More cooperation is needed in
order to counter the potential threats posed by these rogue, or potentially rogue states.
Once again, this cooperation can be best facilitated through the framework ofNATO.
With greater focus on transnational terrorism, democracies should begin to realize the
potential dangers which rogue states present. Exactly how states would benefit from
cooperating against rogue states is very similar to how they would benefit from
cooperating against terrorist groups. Since the threats are virtually one and the same,this
will be detailed when examining the benefits ofcooperating in the fight against
transnational terrorism.
Ultimately, there is now a clear distinction between two sides in a struggle- the
United States on one side, Russia on the other. To be sure, the United States is supported
most heavily in the West by Great Britain, and the Russians maintain support from both
China and Iran. Certainly, these are not the only countries that support either side- there
are many other countries which have begun to support one side or the other. With the
continual cooperation of Russia, China,Iran, and others, it is in the best interest of NATO
to develop the best possible strategy to protect its members and their interests from a
great potential threat to security, political, and economic interests. Adding new members,
which would bring additional manpower and resources with them, is a way in which to
accomplish this. NATO would then be able to promote the cooperation necessary to
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counter, or balance against, any potential gains that China, Russia, and Iran may have
gained against it.
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Chapter 4: NATO and Democracies
It has been often noted that the democracies ofthe world face grave dangers fi'om
international terrorism. NATO has identified terrorism as its greatest threat in the 2006
Comprehensive Political Guidance, which:
provides a fi-amework and political direction for NATO’s continuing
transformation, setting out, for the next 10 to 15 years, the priorities for all
Alliance capability issues, planning disciplines and intelligence. This
guidance, to be reviewed periodically, also aims to increase their
coherence through an effective management mechanism(NATO 2006).
It states, “Terrorism, increasingly global in scope and lethal in results, and the spread of
weapons of mass destruction are likely to be the principal threats to the alliance over the
next 10 to 15 years”(NATO 2006). The same document outlines steps NATO needs to
take in order to transform itself into an effective force against modem threats.
Specifically, it recognizes the need for better cooperation between its own members. In
addition, the document calls for more cooperation and interaction between NATO and its
partners(NATO 2006). It is important to note that most ofthese partners are indeed
democracies from outside the European area- making them currently ineligible for NATO
membership.
In 1989, Francis Fukuyama,then ofthe State Department, wrote an essay entitled
“The End of History?” In this essay Fukuyama declares that history, or at least
ideological history, as we know it was over. He said this was because the Cold War was
essentially over, and Western democracy had defeated Eastern Communism. Fukuyama
asserted, however, that states like Russia and China would take longer in accepting
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liberal democracy than would others. He proposes that even though dramatic events will
continue to occur, there would be no more great advances in human thought. He did not
believe any future event to be important unless it actually caused men to consider
something other than liberal democracy(Bernstein 1989). In fact,"a nuclear war
between India and Pakistan - horrible as that would be for those countries - does not
qualify, unless it somehow forced us to reconsider the basic principles underlying our
social order”(Fukuyama 1989).
History did not end in 1989, as Francis Fukuyama suggested. New actors and
different situations have since developed in the world. Western democracy did win
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Communism in the since that it was able to survive and eventually bring new adherents
into its fold. However, liberal democracy did not become an overarching globally
adopted philosophy. Indeed, new enemies rose to combat the West. This became very
apparent with the destmction ofthe twin towers and part ofthe Pentagon on September
11, 2001. This small group ofterrorists was by no means governed by liberal. Western
democracy. In essence, terrorism has risen to challenge liberal democracy
(Maskaliunaite 2007,5).
All liberal. Western-styled democracies currently face the grave dangers posed by
terrorists. Michael Ignatieff makes a case for this and related matters in his book entitled
The Lesser Evil: Political Ethics in an Age ofTerror. Ignatieffstates that a terrorist may
be defined as “anyone who deliberately targets and kills civilians for political purposes,
and who is a non-state actor”(Ignatieff2004). Michael Ignatieff concludes that the
current war on terror will not come to an end, as did World War n. In addition, he states
that some became terrorists because they felt there was no other choice, whereas others
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chose terror for religious reasons. Whatever the case, he identifies that the terrorism
authored by religious fanatics, such as al-Qaeda, can only be defeated through the
integration of politics and force. Ignatieff acknowledges that democracies often overreact
to acts of terror; however, he concedes that it is almost dangerous not to do so in the 21®*
century. He says this because a new problem exists that did not when many democracies
successfully fought acts ofterror in the 20* century. The fact that states are losing
control of weapons of mass destruction has raised the possibility that these weapons
could fall into the hands ofterror groups, which would not hesitate to put them to use.
He cites the example of Pakistan’s chief nuclear scientist, A.Q. Khan, selling and trading
nuclear secrets. It is his assertion that ifterror groups like al-Qaeda have not already
acquired nuclear capability, it is only a matter oftime until they do acquire these weapons
of mass destruction (Ignatieff2004).
Since democracies face potential threats firom terrorism in the 21®* century, it is
necessary to keep certain things in mind. First, there is a need to determine the
characteristics of democracies, which are seeking protection firom acts ofterror. Next, it
is beneficial to notice the debate currently waging in democracies over security and
liberty in the war on terror. Within this framework it will become apparent when
democracies typically feel it is necessary to take certain liberties firom its citizens,
residents, and visitors. Finally, it becomes necessary to, based on previous research,
identify the problems a single democracy would have fighting terror alone. Similarly, it
is possible to determine the advantages that are gained by democracies cooperating in the
fight against common enemies- terrorists.
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It is first necessary to identify what entity is actually to be protected from
terrorism. Throughout history, many understandings and meanings have developed to
explain the concept of democracy. To be certain, many have disagreed over time about
the true meaning of the concept. Additionally, it can be said that the meaning of
democracy has changed over time. On the simplest oflevels, democracy means “rule by
the people”(Maskaliunaite 2007, 7). Today, Western democracies are actually
representative in nature. In other words, citizens elect others to represent them in
government. There is also the sense ofprotecting the equality of all citizens by ensuring
that they have the right to cast their own vote in elections that are free and fair. Holding
elections of a free and fair nature are not the only things that define the modem Western
democracy. The democracies ofthe West are often referred to as liberal or constitutional
in practice. This simply means that these governments are bound by laws or norms to
protect certain individual freedoms and liberties that their societies have deemed essential
(Maskaliunaite 2007, 7-8). In fact, democracy is “something more than majority rule
disciplined by checks and balances. It is also an order ofrights that puts limits to the
power of the community over individuals”(Ignatieff2004, 5).
Ultimately, in order to be a true, modem democracy, a state must meet a number
of criteria. A state must allow its citizens the opportunity to vote in elections of a free
and fair nature. It must ensure that the power ofthe state is not brought down unfairly on
its citizens. Instead, it should seek to use its powers to protect the freedoms and liberties
of its citizens. In order to be a democracy, a modem state must have mle by law, protect
the rights of minority groups, and,in general, protect human rights. While it would be
untmthful to say that any state can perfectly live up to these expectations, it is possible to
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say that many existing democracies do indeed strive diligently to uphold these values. A
true democracy can be distinguished from a false one by determining ifthe state is
faithfully attempting to implement the aforementioned values. While all states will falter
at some point, in a true democracy these will be exceptions rather than the rule or norm
(Maskaliunaite 2007, 9).
In a sense, democracies, when actively combating a perceived threat, face an
inward debate over how to balance security and liberties. Democracies today are
interested in protecting or promoting a number ofthings, including protecting the lives of
citizens. Modem democracies are now interested in protecting the equality ofcitizens in
the political realm, regulating the power of majorities, maintaining a voice for minorities,
and defending individual freedoms and civil rights. Perhaps most importantly, the idea of
popular sovereignty is now protected by democracies. In other words,those in authonty,
at least in democracies, have come to the realization that their powers actually come
directly from those they govern. Over time, these rights have become paramount

in both

the legal systems of democracies and the international commumty as a whole. These
values, which democratic states hold as most important, can been seen in the international
community by conventions such as the Convention Against Torture and Other, Cruel
Inhuman or Degrading Treatment. The previously detailed rights embody standards
which democracies must meet. Without these no state can truly be a democracy in the
modem, moral sense ofthe term (Maskaliunaite 2007,9).
In democracies, one value is sometimes given preeminence over the others. This
occurs when fear runs rampant and citizens become extremely reactionary. When
citizens feel that an external attack on their nation is imminent,they are often willing to
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sacrifice civil liberties for security. Certainly, many would justify this action because
without security there is no need for civil liberties. This dilemma was certainly present in
the democracies ofthe United States,the United Kingdom,and Spain in the aftermath of
vicious terrorist attacks. Many argued that each democracy enjoyed too many fireedoms
and allowed too many people to immigrate. To be certain, this is far from uncommon.
As noted, many people are willing to sacrifice civil liberties for security. In addition,
many are willing to give away the civil liberties ofa nation’s minority population rather
than their own (Maskaliunaite 2007,10-11). This usually is best seen by looking at a
government which is on the brink of war. In order to protect a majority ofits citizens, a
. Even ifit
government will often lessen or weaken the civil liberties of minority groups
does not actually seek to do so, a government will often allow the public to denigrate
these minority groups without fear ofpunishment. This was certainly the case in the
United States before the outbreak of World War II. The U.S. government actively sought
to limit the civil liberties ofthose people which were deemed potential threats. In other
words, those who spoke out against the government and its actions likely faced fines
war
and/or imprisonment. In fact. President Woodrow Wilson noted that when facmg a
“people would forget there was ever such a thing as tolerance”(Swisher 1940,321).
Whether it be sacrificing the liberties ofthe minority or the population as a whole,
democracies must consider whether so doing is absolutely necessary to be victorious in
the current struggle (Maskaliunaite 2007,11).
The threat posed by terrorism has been often debated. As previously noted,
Ignatieff identified that democracies often overreact to the mherent dangers posed by
terrorism. However, with the possibility that terror organizations could easily obtain
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weapons of mass destruction, it would be unwise for democracies to not take some
action. Some advocate that all avenues should be left open for democracies to fight
terror- even combating evil with evil. In other words, democracies should be willing to
fight terror with torturous methods ifin extreme situations when the very continuance of
those democracies might be at stake. Others, however,find these overreactions to be
more harmful than the terrorist acts themselves(Maskaliunaite 2007,12-18). To be
certain, each democracy must decide what steps it should take in combating terror.
However,if democracies cooperated in fighting terror, it is very possible that many of
these questions would be easier to answer. In the end, democracies would find
themselves in a safer position jfrom both terrorists and overreactions ofcitizens.
Democracies must cooperate ifthey wish to protect themselves fi*om terrorism. In
the end, acting alone will not be enough. Terrorism poses too much ofa global and
extensive threat to be dealt with by a single democracy. Then Secretary ofDefense
Donald Rumsfeld said as much while speaking at the International Institute of Strategic
Studies’ Asia Security Summit. Rumsfeld noted that international cooperation in the war
on terror was not simply desired, it was critical to the war’s success(Rhem 2006). As he
noted,“Small, exclusive groups tend not to be able to effectively do the job (Rumsfeld
2006). In the same speech. Secretary Rumsfeld also alluded to the fact that issues such as
terrorism, arms trafficking, drugs, and piracy can only hope to be solved through
transnational cooperation. It is also important to note that in this speech Rumsfeld
criticized Russia and China for supporting Iran in its desire to become a member ofthe
SCO. Rumsfeld said he was appalled by the action because while the SCO claims to be
opposed to terrorism, its most prominent members are supporting the ascension ofIran.
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Of course, Rumsfeld identifies that Iran has been accused ofbeing a state sponsor of
terrorism by the United States for quite some time. He cites Iranian support ofterrorist
groups Hamas and Hezbollah as examples(Rhem 2006). According to the 2006 Country
Reports on Terrorism^ released in April 2007 by the State Department, Rumsfeld would
still be accurate by the latest records. The third chapter ofthe said report, entitled State
Sponsors of Terrorism Overview,” lists Iran along with Cuba, North Korea, Sudan, and
Syria as state sponsors of terror. In fact, the report listed Iran as the most active state in
its sponsorship of terrorist activity. The report outlined the fact that several Iranian
government agencies were known to have taken part in training and financing both
Palestinian and Shia terrorists. According to the report, several coalition deaths in Iraq
are linked to Iranian equipment and training. The report further notes that Iran
continually refuses to either identify or transfer senior al-Qaeda leaders that it has held
since 2003(U.S. 2007).
It must be noted that democracies do have incentives to cooperate in combating
terror. Cooperation seeks to provide the public good of defense from terror attacks to all.
At this juncture, it becomes advantageous to examine an example ofthe Prisoner s
Dilemma. Figure B-1 shows a simpler example, as countries A and B are contemplating
a preemptive strike on a terrorist organization. If neither country decides to take action.
the status quo remains and neither country experience any gains. Ifcountry A decides to
attack preemptively, but country B does not, then country A nets -2(=4-6). This is
because the costs of6 are taken from the benefits of4. In this same situation, country B
would receive free-rider benefits of4. The same outcome is true ifthe roles ofcountries
A and B are reversed. If both countries decide to attack preemptively, each receives
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benefits of 2. This is because each country’s cost of6 is taken from the total benefit of8.
In the preceding example, each country will most likely choose to do nothing. Instead
they will rely on the other, in hopes of gaining free-rider benefits(Enders and Sandler
2006, 97).
The previous scenario is extended in Figure B-2. In this scenario, the outcomes of
six countries, from the view ofcountry A,are examined. The columns ofFigure B-2
represent the number of preempting countries, other than country A. The row on top
shows country A as it attempts to free-ride. In general terms. Figure B-2 shows that
country A benefits four times more than those countries which chose to preempt. Figure
B-2’s bottom row shows the payoff country A receives when it decides to act
preemptively. Generally speaking, country A gains An-6. This is where n represents the
number of countries preempting and is inclusive ofcountry A.
Figure B-2 shows a situation in which the dominant strategy is to not attack
preemptively. This can be seen by noticing that all the numbers on the top row

are

greater, by two,than the numbers in the bottom row. If all six countries choose to follow
the dominant strategy of doing nothing, nothing is gained. However,if all six countries
decide to attack preemptively, each country gains a payoffofeighteen. The collective
gain for all six countries would then be 108. If all countries choose to do nothing,
together they have suffered a significant blow to their collective welfare. Ultimately, if
every country chooses to free-ride, the society as a whole loses 108 potential benefits. As
more countries are added to the scenario,the cumulative losses ofinaction are increased
(Enders and Sandler 2006,97-98). “For a worldwide network such as al-Qaida, these
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losses from inaction can be extremely large; thus, the need for international cooperation
is highlighted”(Enders and Sandler 2006,98).
The proactive policy of preempting terrorist organizations should be preferable to
defensive policies. This is due to the fact that other states will receive positive
externalities because ofsuccessful preemptive actions. Defensive policies, such as those
pursued in the wake of September 11,2001, caused terrorist organizations to shift their
attacks to other, weaker states. These attacks took place in states such as the Philippines,
Indonesia, Malaysia, Kenya, Morocco,Pakistan, and Saudi Arabia. It is important to
note that the richer states, such as the United States and many other industrialized
countries, had great interests in these aforementioned developing countries(Enders and
Sandler 2006, 136).
As frequently noted, democracies must cooperate ifthey hope to ensure safety
from global threats, such as terrorism. In fact:
The issue is how the world’s premier international military organization
should adapt to the demands ofthe times in a way that advances the
interests notjust ofthe transatlantic community but ofa global community
of democracies dependent on global stability. Global threats cannot be
tackled by a regional organization (Daalder and Goldgeier 2006, 113).
Any failure to cooperate gives an advantage to terrorist organizations. This is because
“terrorist groups cooperate while governments do not,[which] permit[s] terrorists to
exploit government vulnerabilities”(Enders and Sandler 2006, 158).
Throughout its history, NATO has been successful because the Washington
Treaty “demands that members be committed both to the political and economic
principles underpinning democracy and to the common security challenges faced by the
alliance”(Daalder and Goldgeier 2006,113). “It would be foolish not to welcome into
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the alliance other countries that can make the same commitments and help confront new
global challenges”(Daalder and Goldgeier 2006, 113).

I

I

I

i
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Chapters: Forming a Global Alliance
If NATO is to create a new alliance dedicated to combating international
terrorism and other potential threats, several changes must be made. To begin, attitudes
concerning the alliance must be changed. Next, alterations must be made specifically to
the North Atlantic Treaty. These are necessary components by which to set the new
direction in which NATO should travel.
As previously noted, attitudes concerning NATO are beginning to change
worldwide. Many now seem to comprehend that the alliance can transform into a global
anti-terrorism alliance- and still hold to original NATO principles. This changing attitude
can especially be seen in the United States.
While it could not be said that the Bush Administration’s State Department is

m

favor of adding non-European states to NATO,it has certainly advocated a strong
working relationship with many such countries. In fact, one could consider some ofthese
states to be quasi members ofthe alliance.
In his testimony before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs on June 22,
2007, Daniel Fried, Assistant Secretary for European and Eurasian Affairs, declared that
the scope of NATO was increasingly widening. He advocated that NATO hold to its
founding principles while still taking on new roles in the international commumty.
Specifically, Fried said:
During the Cold War,NATO focused on Europe, because that’s where the
dangers were. Now,without abandoning its core missions, NATO
increasingly looks outward, to dangers that can have roots far beyond
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Europe. These dangers include violent extremism, terrorism, nuclear
proliferation, failed states, cyber attacks, and insecurity ofenergy
resources. Protecting NATO members now also requires building
partnerships and developing new capabilities(2007).
Fried continued by saying,“NATO’s missions span a wide geography and a wide array
of activities. This trend is only going to continue”(2007).
Assistant Secretary Fried also offered proofthat NATO has indeed transformed.
He cited Afghanistan as the primary example ofexactly how NATO has changed. This is
a change from the past because the current NATO involvement in Afghanistan is the
alliance’s first major mission outside the continent ofEurope. Ultimately, Fried
articulated that this is the direction in which NATO should continue. In reference to
Afghanistan, Fried said, “Thirty seven countries-26 Allies and 11 non-NATO partnersparticipate in NATO’s UN-mandated International Security Assistance Forces:

over

40,000 troops”(2007). Coupled with later statements about the transformation ofNATO,
it is obvious that current policy is in favor ofexpanding NATO,at least as far

as

increased involvement in world affairs is concerned.
Fried’s own words show that the role ofNATO is expanding globally. He said:
In 1994, NATO had 16 members and no partners. It had never conducted a
military operation. At the end of2005 the alliance was runnmg eight
military operations simultaneously and had 26 members and partnership
relationships with another 20 countries around the world. Developing the
capabilities so that NATO can launch and sustain these missions takes
political will and resources(2007).
In fact. Assistant Secretary Fried concluded that,“NATO’s enlargement is one ofthe
great successes in Europe after the fall ofthe Iron Curtain”(2007). As will be further
noted, forming a global NATO will serve to both accomplish and enhance the desired
global cooperation.
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In reality, NATO began to recognize the need to work with global partners long
ago. In 1989, the United States created the designation ofa major non-NATO ally. This
was expanded in 1996 to include more benefits for the designees; therefore, the United
States Congress actually created this designation by two different pieces oflegislation.
The first can be found in Title 10 ofthe U.S. Code(10 U.S.C. §2350a). It originally
applied to Australia, Egypt,Israel, Japan,and South Korea. Jordan, in 1996, Argentina,
in 1998, New Zealand and Bahrain, in 2002,the Philippines and Thailand, in 2003, and
Kuwait, in 2004 were added later, respectively. 10 U.S.C. §2350a allowed these
countries to bid on repairing defense equipment ofthe United States. These states also
have the opportunity to receive financial assistance fi-om the United States for the
purpose ofjointly developing, or improving,conventional defense mechanisms and
technology capable of both detecting explosives and countering terrorism. In addition,
these countries stand to benefit fixsm the United States accepting the financial risk ofthe
selling or leasing ofdefensive capabilities to the said countries. In 1996, MNNAs were
given more benefits under Title 22 ofthe U.S. Code(22 U.S.C. §2321k). 22 U.S.C.
§232Ik originally applied only to Australia, Egypt, Israel, Japan, South Korea, and New
Zealand. Jordan, Argentina, Bahrain, the Philippines, Thailand, and Kuwait became
eligible for the benefits under this provision at the same time they fell under 10 U.S.C.
§2350a (Scoville 2004).
In 1994, NATO created the Partnership for Peace Program (PfP)in order to
facilitate a better working relationship between itself and its partners. Based on
democratic principles of NATO,“the purpose ofthe Partnership for Peace is to increase
stability, diminish threats to peace and build strengthened security relationships between
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individual Partner countries and NATO,as well as among Partner countries”(NATO
2008). Each signatory to the Framework Document agrees to strive to implement certain
democratic political principles. Each country seeks:
to preserve democratic societies; to maintain the principles ofinternational law; to
fulfill obligations under the UN Charter, the Universal Declaration ofHuman
Rights, the Helsinki Final Act and international disarmament and arms control
agreements; to refrain from the threat or use offorce against other states; to
respect existing borders; and to settle disputes peacefully(NATO 2008).

These partners also dedicate themselves to maintaining firm,democratic control over
their respective militaries. In other words, countries agree to be more open and
forthcoming with information about their military budgets and planning. Partners in this
program also commit themselves to being able to participate in both peacekeeping and
aid missions on behalf of NATO. According to the Framework Document,the alliance
must, at the very least, consult with a partner who feels that its territory is threatened by
either the loss ofindependence or security. Ultimately, members ofthe PfP
independently make two-year commitments to the alliance based on issues on which the
PfP members wish to cooperate(NATO 2008). Albania, Armenia, Austria, Azerbaijan,
Belarus, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Finland, Georgia, Ireland, Kazakhstan,
Kyrghyz Republic, Moldova, Montenegro, Russia, Serbia, Sweden, Switzerland,
Tajikistan, The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Turkmenistan, the Ukraine,
and Uzbekistan are all currently members ofthe Partnership for Peace Program. The
Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland are former members ofthe PfP but became
members of NATO in March 1999. Similarly, Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania,
Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia are former members ofthe PfP but became members of
NATO in March 2004.
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NATO,in 1999, launched their Membership Action Plan(MAP). The program
was created to assist countries wishing to join NATO. Aspiring members prepare and
submit annual reports on how they are seeking to meet requirements for NATO
membership. These cover political, economic, resource, national defense, general
security, and legal requirements. MAP countries receive feedback on how they are
progressing and are given advice on how to proceed further. These states also benefit by
receiving a heightened state ofcooperation between NATO and themselves in planning
and defense matters. Currently, Albania, The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia,
and Croatia are the only three members of MAP. Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania,
Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia were formerly members ofMAP but have now become
members of NATO(NATO 2002).
The steps NATO has taken to facilitate global cooperation are simply not far
reaching enough. Forming only global partnerships limits the alliance’s capabilities.
Even with international partners, NATO often finds itself unable to form coalitions
except on an ad hoc basis. It appears that granting membership status to states outside
Europe is preferable to coalitions of an ad hoc nature(Daalder and Goldgeier 2006,110).
This is because an alliance and ad hoc coalitions are inherently different. Militarily
speaking,“a coalition is an informal agreement for common action between two or more
nations. An alliance, on the other hand, is a more formal arrangement for broad, long
term objectives”(Silkett 1993, 74). Silkett continues to argue that coalitions usually
agree on only a few issues, while alliances tend to have actual long-term goals beyond
those ofthe mission at hand. He argues that alliances are less affected than are coalitions
by problems with equipment, logistics, military doctrine, and differences in culture and
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language. Silkett asserts that these alliances have an advantage over ad hoc coalitions
because they have had time to cooperate on the previously mentioned items. Coalitions
often do not have the time and/or willingness to cooperate enough to be completely
successful in a mission (Silkett 1993, 74-85). NATO needs to take this step, in large part,
because many European militaries are overcommitted. They have been taking on new
roles in places such as Afghanistan, the Congo, Sudan, and Africa in general. In essence,
European members of NATO would benefit from other, and possibly more capable, states
coming in to share the load of military operations. Actual membership status for nonEuropean states would greatly benefit the United States as well. This would allow the
United States to enjoy increased planning, training, and fighting alongside their former
partners, now colleagues. Considering this is what enables NATO to function
effectively, this would be extremely beneficial in the event ofa crisis. Despite the vast
technological advantage the United States holds over its allies, it has proven most
effective in fighting alongside troops from nations with which it has often trained
(Daalder and Goldgeier 2006,110-111).
In order to prepare the alliance for global expansion, intermediate steps could be
taken. In effect, these steps could be seen as similar to those that the alliance took before
adding additional members from Eastern Europe. The countries being prepped for
membership could be allowed to formally place military liaisons with the Supreme
Headquarters Allied Powers Europe, located in Mons,Belgium. Next, NATO could
create the Global Partnership Council. This council would act in the same manner as the
Euro-Atlantic Council, which currently stimulates dialogue between members of NATO
and its partners in both Europe and Central Asia(Daalder and Goldgeier 2006, 111).
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In order to accomplish the goal of adding members from all over the globe,
NATO must amend the Washington Treaty. Specifically, Article X must be altered in
order for membership to be available to non-European countries. It currently states:
The Parties may, by unanimous agreement, invite any other European State in a
position to further the principles ofthis Treaty and to contribute to the security of
the North Atlantic area to accede to this Treaty. Any State so invited may become
a Party to the Treaty by depositing its instrument of accession with the
Government ofthe United States of America. The Government ofthe United
States of America will inform each ofthe Parties ofthe deposit ofeach such
instrument of accession.
It would simply need to be changed in order to allow members ofNATO to invite any
country who would serve to further the values and goals ofthe organization. Currently,
countries, such as Belarus, have “a questionable commitment to democracy and hiunan
rights”(Daalder and Goldgeier 2006,111) are eligible, territorially speaking, for
becoming members of NATO. However, committed democracies, such as Australia and
Japan, are not capable ofjoining the alliance. Amending Article X is necessary in order
dedicated
for NATO to form a global alliance. In this way the NATO members would be
to the same values and principles, such as democratic principles, as opposed to often
having only geography in common. Because of potential threats facing the world today,
democratic principles and values are much more important than geography alone
(Daalder and Goldgeier 2006, 111).
Many often fear that a global NATO would be unable to form a necessary
consensus, as has been the operating procedure. While forming a consensus in a globally
expanded NATO might become more difficult, it should not stop the alliance from adding
members outside Europe. For example, during the 1990s, many feared that expanding
membership to Eastern Europe would cause the same problem. In essence, this problem
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has not developed. NATO members have found ways to form a consensus without
always agreeing. Instead of blocking operations, members who disagree often simply
allow an operation to go forward without participating in it. There is no reason why this
process could not continue even with the addition ofnew members firom all over the
globe (Daalder and Goldgeier 2006,112).
Article V commitments inside a more global NATO should not cause concern.
Many have postulated that the alliance would spread its commitments so far that its
members would be unable to defend every member against an attack. Still, the principle
that “an attack on one is an attack on all”(Daalder and Goldgeier 2006,112) must remain
at the center ofthe alliance’s values. Article V continues by stating that each member
must, in response to an attack on a fellow member,take the measures it finds necessary.
In other words, no country would be absolutely forced to come to the defense ofa fellow
member. However, Article V would still continue to promote cooperation in the event of
such an attack. In addition, it would provide a sort ofcover for states to cooperate. That
is to say that a state could always cite Article V as their reason for coming to the aid of
another member of NATO. In essence, this would give an operation greater legitimacy
(Daalder and Goldgeier 2006,112-113).
Ultimately, NATO would not threaten any other organization, such as the United
Nations or the European Union. Despite NATO’s stance as primarily a military alliance,
it is also dedicated to democratic principles. Even so, a global NATO would not seek to
become either ofthe previously mentioned orgamzations. If nothing else, a global
NATO would benefit both the United Nations and the European Union. A global NATO
could serve to militarily enforce many U.N. resolutions- resolutions that the U.N. could
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not agree to enforce alone. The European Union would be a perfect partner for a global
NATO. As the E.U. has advanced in its specialization of“post-conflict reconstruction
and policing,”(Daalder and Goldgeier 2006,113)increased NATO military actions in the
world would only benefit them (Daalder and Goldgeier 2006,113).
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Chapter 6: Additional Members and Resources
At this juncture it becomes necessary to briefly examine some ofthe nations that
NATO would be interested in adding as members, if it decided to expand globally. Some
of the top candidates, as identified by Daalder and Goldgeier, appear to be Australia,
Brazil, India, Japan, New Zealand, South AiBrica, and South Korea(2006,109). In

so

doing, it can be seen whether the country in question meets the basic nonns for NATO
membership. In addition, it is possible to determine what advantages each country could
bring to the alliance. In this process, each country will be given its democracy rating, as
assigned by The Economist. These ranks were determined by comparing the electoral
process, the function of government, political participation and culture, and civil liberties
in any given country. The CIA’s World Fact Book will also be used to determine each
state’s GDP (purchasing power parity), GDP (official exchange rate), and form of
government. GDP(PPP)is “the sum value of all goods and services produced in the
country valued at prices prevailing in the United States(Central Intelligence Agency
2008). GDP(OER)is “is the home-currency-denominated annual GDP figure divided by
the bilateral average U.S. exchange rate with that country in that year”(Central
Intelligence Agency 2008). In addition, the CIA’s World Fact Book will also be used to
determine how much ofa country’s GDP is used on defense spending.
NATO has certain pre-conditions which states must commonly meet in order to
become members ofthe alliance. These pre-conditions can be divided into the political.
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economic, and defensive spheres. When looking at the political structure of a potential
member, NATO looks for a civilian-run military, good treatment of minority groups, and
a democratic system. In the economic category, NATO simply looks for a market
economy, preferably a market economy that is at least as strong as that ofthe lowest
performing market economy already belonging to a member ofNATO. In the defensive
component, NATO seeks states with a great capability to contribute militarily to the
alliance. The political category is often assessed by looking at fi'eedom scores, such as
those compiled by Freedom House and The Economist. The economic component is
often determined by examining a state’s GDP(PPP)and GDP(OER). When considering
the defensive component, NATO often examines a potential member’s defensive
spending, as a percentage of GDP(Szayna 2001,68-69).
The most intriguing potential addition to a global NATO is Australia. The
Commonwealth of Australia is a federal parliamentary democracy. In other words,
Australia, under its Constitution, divides its powers between a central government and
several local or regional governments. The central executive government is basically
selected by the Federal Parliament. The party makeup ofthe Federal Parliament is based
on elections when voters choose their party preferences. The executives are umquely
subject, in a sense, to both the Federal Parliament and the people as a whole (Central
Intelligence Agency 2008). According to The Economist, Australia is the eighth overall
strongest democracy in the world (2007, 3). It is estimated that in 2007, Australia s GDP
(PPP)was $766.8 billion, which is nineteenth best. In 2006,the Commonwealth of
Australia spent 2.4% ofits GDP on military expenditures. The 2007 estimate for
Australia’s GDP(OER)is $889.7 billion (Central Intelligence Agency 2008).
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Brazil is a federal republic, which means that the central government is somewhat
limited and regional governments retain some power. The ultimate power, as in all
democracies, remains with the people of Brazil, who choose representatives(Central
nd

Intelligence Agency 2008). The Federative Republic ofBrazil is labeled as the 42
strongest democracy in the world today {The Economist 2007,3). Brazil’s estimated
GDP(PPP)for 2007 was $1.838 trillion. This is good enough for eleventh on the world
stage. It is estimated that, in 2006, The Federative Republic ofBrazil also spent 2.6^ of
its GDP on its military. Brazil’s 2007 estimate for GDP(OER)is $1,269 trillion (Central
Intelligence Agency 2008).
Another country at which to look is India. Arguably the world’s oldest
democracy, India is labeled as the globe’s 35 strongest{The Economist 2007,3). Like
Brazil, the Republic ofIndia is a federal republic, The Republic ofIndia spent 2.5% of
its GDP on military spending in 2007. Additionally, India’s GDP(PPP)was $2,965
trillion in 2007; this was good for the sixth overall. The 2007 estimate for India s GDP
(OER)is $1.09 trillion (Central Intelligence Agency 2008).

,limited by

The head ofstate in Japan is the emperor. The monarchy is, however

a constitution which gives most power to the Diet. Japan has a parliamentary
decided by
government in which the prime minister is ofthe majority party, which was
the general public in parliamentary elections. Additionally, the Diet may be shut down
by the prime minister, which can be ousted by a no confidence vote firom the Diet
(Central Japan 2008). The Japanese democracy is labeled as being the 20*’’ strongest on
the globe {The Economist 2007, 3). hi 2006,Japan spent.8% ofits GDP on military
expenditures. In 2007, it is estimated that Japan’s GDP(PPP)was $4,346 trillion, which
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makes Japan fifth in the world. Japan’s 2007 GDP(OER)estimate is $4,346 trillion
(Central Intelligence Agency 2008).
It has been determined that New Zealand is currently the eleventh strongest
democracy on Earth {The Economist 2007,3). New Zealand’s form ofgovernment is
also a parliamentary democracy. It is estimated that, in 2007,New Zealand’s GDP(PPP)
was $112.6 billion, or 61^^ overall. New Zealand also spent 1% ofits GDP in 2005 on
military spending. It is estimated that, in 2007, New Zealand had a GDP(OER)of
$124.4 billion (Central Intelligence Agency 2008).
South Africa is a republic, which allows its citizens to elect representatives to pass
laws for them (Central Intelligence Agency 2008). According to The Economist,the
Republic of South Africa is the 29^ strongest democracy in the world (2007,3). The
Republic of South Afiica spent 1.7% ofits GDP on its military in 2006. South Africa s
2007 estimated GDP(PPP)was $467.6 billion or 27^ overall. South Africa’s 2007 GDP
(OER)estimate is $274.5 billion (Central Intelligence Agency 2008).
Like South Africa, South Korea is republican in its form ofgovernment(Central
Intelligence Agency 2008). The Republic ofKorea is identified as being the 31^
strongest democracy on Earth {The Economist 2007,3). The Republic ofKorea,in 2006,
spent 2.7% ofits GDP on its military. In 2007,it is estimated that South Korea’s GDP
(PPP)was $1.206 trillion. This was good enough to earn South Korea the sixteenth
ranking in the world. South Korea’s 2007 GDP(OER)estimate is $981.9 billion (Central
Intelligence Agency 2008).
Ultimately, all the previously mentioned countries would bring something of
additional value to the alliance, the most important of which is even stronger democratic
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principles. The high GDP(PPP)and GDP(OER)in Japan, India, Brazil, Australia, and
South Korea prove that the said countries do indeed have vibrant economies. This
ensures that these countries, as well as New Zealand and South Africa which also have
strong economies, will not experience a great deal ofpoverty and destabilization. This,
in turn, makes the countries more secure and more able to participate in the war against
international terrorism. Because ofstrong economies,these countries can afford to spend
a larger percentage oftheir respective GDPs on defense. This spending would certainly
aid NATO in its fight against transnational terrorism. The military capabilities of
Australia, South Korea, and India are also very appealing. Possibly most important is the
great cooperation between these states, the United States, and NATO. All ofthese,
including South Africa, have had a good working relationship with the United States and
NATO in the fight against terror. In fact, Japan, South Korea, New Zealand, and
Australia have been heavily involved, both militarily and financially, in the war against
m
international terrorism. It is important to note that these states provide additional bases i
and around both the Middle East and Central Asia. With this additional temtory, NATO
would be able to better defend itself against international terrorism and other potential
threats. In order to receive the maximum benefit ofthese additional resources, NATO
must add the aforementioned countries as full members ofNATO. Doing so would add
much additional money into NATO’s defense spending. As outlined previously,
membership status would breed a state ofcooperation between these states and current
members of NATO that could not be reached otherwise. Adding Australia, Brazil, India,
Japan, South Africa, and South Korea as members ofNATO would ensure more
resources and cooperation in the fight against international terrorism.
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Chapter?: Conclusion
NATO is at an importantjuncture in its history. It must choose whether it is
beneficial for the alliance and its members to expand traditionally, globally, or both.
NATO has certainly become much more involved globally than at any time in its history.
This is due, in large part, to the fact that NATO faces threats that are global in nature. In
order to protect itself, the alliance must globalize. In other words, it is unbeneficial for
NATO to continue its protection of Western Europe against a possible invasion by a
hostile country. Terrorism poses graves dangers to members ofthe alliance and can only
be dealt with through global action, seeing that terrorists can plan attacks on one side of
the globe and carry them out on the other.
The alliance has become much more involved in the affairs ofthe globe. In fact,
many members of NATO,as well as many global partners, have taken part in the fight
against the Taliban and al-Qaeda in Afghanistan. By 2003, NATO was directing its first
major operation outside of Europe, as the ISAF in Afghanistan. Additionally, many
members of NATO participated in the U.S.-led coalition against Saddam Hussein and
terrorism in Iraq.
Attitudes concerning a global NATO are indeed changing. NATO,U.S., and
other world officials have noted the possible benefits gained by global cooperation. This
has especially been true with democracies. Considering that many states have lost
control over their own nuclear and biological weapons,it is very possible that these
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weapons could easily fall into the hands ofterrorists. Accordingly, democracies face a
common threat from international terrorism. Therefore, NATO should consider
expanding globally in order to protect itself, the world’s democracies, and its democratic
agenda.
NATO still faces a possible threat from Russia, China, and Iran. At the very least,
their ever increasing cooperation should be ofconcern to the alliance. Considenng
relations between the West, Russia, and China are strained at best, not much room is left
for any further hostile actions. The great support for Iran by Russia and China has the
potential of souring relations to an irreparable state. Certainly, much concern is
generated by the fact that Iran has been consistently identified, by the United States, as
the world’s leading state sponsor ofterror. In a sense, the issues ofRussia, China,Iran,
and international terrorism are interrelated.
If NATO decided to expand globally, as it should, the alliance would stand to gam
significant resources from potential members. Nations such as Australia, Japan,India,
and South Korea all have large sums of money that could be invested in NATO s
operations and military budgets. In addition, these countries, as well as others previously
mentioned, have already proven themselves to be effective partners in the war on terror.
Membership status for these would bring the increased cooperation that is necessary if
the alliance hopes to be successful in standing against terror, other potential threats, and
for democratic values.
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Appendix A: Tables
Table A-1. Features Distinguishing Left- Wingfrom Fundamentalist Terrorists
Fundamentalists
Left-wing Terrorists
●

Maintain constituency

●

Uninterested in constituency

●

Symbolic target, minimal collateral
damage

●

General target, maximal collateral
damage

●
●

Speak for group
Influence a wider audience

●
●

Speak for God
Not audience-oriented

♦

Pursue a political goal

●

Act is a goal in itself

●
●

Degrade enemy
Secular

●

Demonize, dehumanize enemy

●

Religious

●
●

Often do not claim responsibility
Suicide missions as a mode ofattack

● Claim responsibility
● Non-suicide missions
Source: Enders and Sandler 48

72

Appendix B: Figures
Figure B-1. Two-target preemption game.
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Source: Enders and Sandler 97

Figure B-2. Six-nation preemption game.
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